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THE CREATION OF TRIBAL CULTURAL HEGEMONY UNDER
THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT AND NATIVE
AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION
ACT
ANDREW W. MINIKOWSKI*

One ought not to hoard culture. It should be adapted and infused into
society as a leaven.
-WALLACE STEVENS
ABSTRACT
Congress enacted the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act with the goal of
providing tribes with greater control and authority over their own handicraft
traditions and cultural resources. Although both laws have been successful
in many aspects, both have also produced unintended consequences that
have disadvantaged less powerful tribal groups and individual Native
American artisans. This Article explores those consequences, particularly
in respect to situations where the Acts enable economically and politically
powerful tribal groups to exert control over what constitutes legitimate
Native American culture and what does not. This Article concludes with
suggestions as to how Congress may make simple amendments to both laws
that would address the identified issues and allow for more equitable
control over authentic Native American culture by all tribal groups, rather
than only those currently empowered under the Acts.

* Legal Fellow, Connecticut Fund for the Environment; Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable
Carmen E. Espinosa, Connecticut Supreme Court. J.D. 2015, Vermont Law School; M.E.LP.
2015, Vermont Law School; B.A. 2012, Eastern Connecticut State University. I would like to
thank Professor Hillary M. Hoffmann of Vermont Law School for her feedback on this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a remarkable feat that North America’s indigenous peoples retain
much of their original culture. Four hundred years of assimilationist
pressure and explicit policy would have overcome a people less fiercely
protective of their own cultural traditions. Across the United States today,
federally recognized and unrecognized tribes continue to perform rituals,
pass down oral traditions, and practice arts in the same manner as their
ancestors before them. However, native cultural traditions are still at risk—
both internally and externally.
Between the mid-1970s and early 1990s, Congress enacted a number of
laws aimed at protecting and encouraging tribal culture and economies.1

1. See Jeff R. Keohane, The Rise of Tribal Self-Determination and Economic Development,
33 HUMAN RIGHTS 9–12 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/human_rights_vol33_2006/spring2006/hr_spring06_keohane.html
(providing
overview of federal legislation during this period and the rapid growth of tribal autonomy and
economic benefits).
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Among such laws were the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,2 the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act (“IACA”),3 and the Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).4
Since enactment, both IACA and NAGPRA have caused considerable
controversy both inside and outside of Indian country.5 Congress enacted
IACA to prevent non-Indian artisans from presenting their work as
authentic Indian work and thereby deceiving consumers.6 NAGPRA,
through its interplay with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act
(“ARPA”),7 ensures that federally funded museums return tribal ceremonial
objects and human remains back to the tribes and gives tribes primary rights
over all native burial sites located on federal and Indian lands.8 Though
both IACA and NAGPRA have the intended effect of giving tribes
enforceable rights with which to protect native culture, both statutes also
have the unintended consequence of consolidating tribal cultural
authority—much to the detriment of unaffiliated Indians and other less
powerful tribal groups.9 This Article argues that the operation of IACA and
NAGPRA has created tribal “cultural hegemonies”10 in which tribes can
diminish minority voices in tribal culture and hinder legitimate
anthropological and archeological research. Part I of this Article provides

2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
5. See generally Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (concerning the
controversy around the ownership remains of the “Kennewick Man”); see also James J.
Kilpatrick, A Cozy Little Restraint of Trade Rules Indian Arts and Crafts, SUN SENTINEL (Dec.
13, 1992), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1992-12-13/news/9203060467_1_indian-tribe-indianarts-indian-blood (describing the adverse economic effects of IACA on Indian artisans not
affiliated with a recognized tribe).
6. Jennie D. Woltz, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the Indian
Arts & Crafts Act of 1990 be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 442,
446 (2007).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 470(aa)-(mm) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (requiring federal
museums and agencies to “expeditiously return” human remains and funerary objects to tribes); 25
U.S.C. § 3002(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (establishing order of control over
Native American remains and funerary objects discovered on federal or Indian lands).
9.
Matthew H. Birkhold, Note, Tipping NAGPRA’s Balancing Act: The Inequitable
Disposition of “Culturally Unidentified” Human Remains Under NAGPRA’s New Provision, 37
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2046, 2056 (2011) (recognizing lack of standing under NAGPRA for
federally unrecognized tribes and Indian groups); Rob Roy Smith, The Indian Arts and Crafts Act:
What Your Clients Need to Know, 19 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N INDIAN L. NEWSLETTER 1, 5
(2011–2012),
http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Sections/Indian-Law-Section/~/media/
Files/Legal%20Community/Sections/Indian%20Law/Indian%20Newsletters/Winter%2020112012
%20Vol%2019%20No%202.ashx (observing that the political definition of “Indian” that IACA
uses disadvantages unenrolled Indians and unrecognized tribal entities).
10. This Article uses the term “cultural hegemony” as a term of “best fit” rather than the
term’s traditional use within Marxist social theory.
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an overview of the statutory and regulatory schemes of IACA and
NAGPRA. Part II outlines some of the controversies and recurring issues
that have arisen under the statutes. Part III provides a number of
suggestions as to how IACA and NAGPRA could be employed to more
effectively safeguard tribal culture for all American Indians rather than for
dominant tribal groups.
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

Both IACA and NAGPRA are broad, multifaceted statutes that address
numerous issues. As such, the following section details only those
provisions of IACA and NAGPRA that are necessary for an overall
understanding of both statutes’ operative mechanisms as well as those
provisions directly relevant to the concerns of this Article. Similarly,
discussion of ARPA is limited to those areas in which the statute interacts
with the substantive provisions of NAGPRA.
A. THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT
At its heart, IACA is essentially “a truth-in-marketing” consumer
protection law that protects Indian manufacturers and consumers alike from
knock-off products that companies present as being of genuine Indian
make.11 In the years prior to IACA’s enactment, the American consumer
market experienced increased demand for traditional Indian-made goods.12
As a result, many non-Indian retailers and overseas manufacturers began
producing and selling generic Indian handicrafts, with resulting economic
losses to genuine Indian craft artisans and a cheapening of the cultural
integrity of traditional native handicraft traditions.13 To protect genuine
tribal artisans, IACA imposes both civil and criminal liability on individual
and organizational violators.14 The criminal penalties of IACA are
strikingly severe. Individual violators can be subject to fines amounting to
$250,000 and up to five years imprisonment.15 Corporate manufacturers

11. 25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2017); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §
20.02[5] (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2005 ed.) (describing IACA as a consumer and
manufacturer protection law).
12. Woltz, supra note 6, at 445.
13. H.R. 2006, 101st Cong., pt. 2 (1990) (describing the adverse effect of imitation Indian
goods on tribal economies, including the loss of millions of dollars of tribal revenue); see also
Woltz, supra note 6, at 446 (describing the adverse cultural effects on tribes when manufacturers
misuse tribal symbols on counterfeit goods).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1159.
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and retailers may be subject to fines of $1,000,000.16 Subsequent violations
carry the risk of increased fines and terms of imprisonment.17 Furthermore,
courts have interpreted IACA to be a strict liability statute, offering
defendants little room to maneuver around its penalties.18 Tribes and
individual Indian artisans can also obtain injunctive relief against violators
under the statute’s civil provisions.19
Though the primary purpose of IACA is to protect traditional Indian
artisans, the statute also has the effect of essentially establishing Indian
tribes as gatekeepers of the Indian handicrafts market. Under IACA, an
“Indian” for the purposes of the statute is a person who is “a member of an
Indian tribe” or a person that an Indian tribe certifies as “an Indian
artisan.”20 Somewhat atypically for a federal statute, IACA’s definition of
“Indian tribe” includes not only federally recognized tribes and Alaska
native village corporations, but those tribes that have only obtained statelevel recognition.21 Thus, the statute, at first glance, provides a seemingly
liberal definition of which artisans are and are not “Indians” for the
purposes of IACA. However, IACA has the effect of giving tribes the
enormous power of deciding who can and cannot enter the Indian
handicrafts marketplace.22 Though this statutorily-conferred power seems
to resemble at first the inherent sovereign power of tribes to determine
membership criteria, it is in practice a notably different creature and has
proved the source of controversy that has sprung up around IACA. The
effect of this power and its consequences will be discussed in greater length
below.
B. THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION
ACT AND THE ARCHAEOLOGICALRESOURCES PROTECTION ACT
Under the traditional English common law, there is no property interest
that vests in a dead human body, although American courts have been
willing to recognize a “quasi-right” in corpses for family members who

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Native American Arts, Inc. v. Village Orientals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (“[T]he court construes [IACA] to impose strict liability for each commercial transaction
involving a ‘false suggestion’ that merchandise was manufactured by Indians.”).
19. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); see also Native American
Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (recognizing the right of
Indian organizations and individuals to pursue civil actions under IACA, though finding no
standing under the facts of that particular case).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(1).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(3); see also 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(e) (2017).
22. 25 C.F.R. § 309.25(a) (2017).
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must obtain a body for funeral purposes.23 Following several highly
publicized incidences of grave-looting and desecration, and subsequent
outrage from tribal communities, Congress sought to develop a solution
concerning the control of native human remains.24 In response, Congress
enacted NAGPRA to give tribes greater regulatory control over native
burial sites and human remains.25
The coverage of NAGPRA is
extraordinarily broad. To some extent, the operation of NAGPRA causes
the international drama over Greece’s Elgin Marbles to play out daily on the
domestic stage.26
As its primary operative mechanism, NAGPRA
establishes an affirmative duty for all federally funded museums and
research institutions to catalogue and return native funerary objects and
human remains to their affiliated tribes.27
Notably, this so-called
“repatriation” provision applies to all relics, regardless of when a museum
Thus, NAGPRA provides tribes with
initially acquired them.28
considerable authority to reclaim traditional objects, even from public
educational institutions. Second, NAGPRA imposes criminal liability on
any individual for trafficking in Native American human remains and
cultural objects.29 Accordingly, NAGPRA provides a strong incentive
against the long history of grave-robbing that has caused considerable
anguish in Indian communities. Finally, and most importantly for the
purposes of this Article, NAGPRA provides tribes with significant
regulatory oversight of cultural resources, human remains, and
archaeological excavations on tribal lands.
23. See Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 967–69 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)
(providing an excellent overview of property rights in human corpses from the time of Blackstone
to the present).
24. Hugh Dellios & Rick Pearson, Neighbors Mourn Dickson Mounds’ Demise, CHICAGO
TRIB. (Nov. 26, 1991), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-11-26/news/9104170045
_1_native-americans-jim-edgar-archeologists (describing tension between Illinois residents and
Native American groups over the treatment of native human remains on display at the Dickson
Mounds burial site); see also N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 161–62
(2008) (describing the theft of the skull and funerary objects of the great Native American leader
Geronimo by Yale University’s notorious “secret” Skull & Bones Society).
25. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
26. See Michael Kimmelman, Elgin Marble Argument in a New Light, N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/arts/design/24abroad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(describing the ongoing disagreement between the United Kingdom and Greece over the
ownership of the Elgin Marbles). In many ways, the debate over the proper ownership of the
Marbles resembles the debates between tribes and scientists over the proper place for tribal
funerary relics and human remains.
27. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
28. See Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that NAGPRA applies to all artifacts, even those acquired before the enactment of the statute).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); see United States v. Kramer,
168 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding the criminal provisions of NAGPRA against
an individual defendant).
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NAGPRA’s definition of “tribal lands” is extremely broad and
encompasses lands that would not normally be considered as “Indian
country.”30 Accordingly, tribes have considerable control over cultural
resources, even those discovered outside of “traditional” Indian country.
NAGPRA’s provisions in this regard apply to both intentional
archaeological excavations and the inadvertent discovery of cultural
resources or human remains during other activities.31 In regard to those
resources discovered on tribal lands, however, NAGPRA gives the
landowning tribe essentially unbridled authority over those cultural
resources.32 Although NAGPRA is far-reaching, the Act’s provisions are
subject to several important limits, namely possession of resources for
legitimate scientific study, delayed possession in the case of competing
ownership claims, and takings claims.33
However, NAGPRA’s efficacy is significantly influenced by the
statute’s simultaneous operation and jurisdictional overlap with ARPA. A
slightly earlier statute, ARPA provides a scheme for federal oversight of
archaeological excavations and the discovery of cultural resources on
federal and public lands.34 Accordingly, the protection of tribal cultural
resources is essentially split between NAGPRA and ARPA.35
ARPA generally requires a permit for archaeological excavations on
federal property.36 This requirement applies to tribal lands, though ARPA
does define those lands more narrowly than NAGPRA does.37 The most
significant interplay between NAGPRA and ARPA, however, is that
obtaining a permit for an excavation on tribal lands requires the consent of
the tribe or the tribal landowner, in addition to the Department of the
Interior.38 Notably, tribes themselves are exempt from the permit
requirements of ARPA on tribal lands and individual tribal members can
also be exempt from the requirements of the Act.39 Thus, the intersection
between NAGPRA and ARPA creates different requirements and rights for
Indian tribes than other parties in regard to the excavation of cultural

30. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
31. 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.3(c), 10.5 (2017).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
33. Id. § 3005.
34. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(aa)-(mm) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
35. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 1230 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al., eds., 2005).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 470aa.
37. Id. § 470(bb)(4).
38. Id. § 470cc(g)(2); 43 C.F.R. § 7.8(a)(5) (2017).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1); 25 C.F.R. § 262.4(c).
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resources. The issues that this scenario creates are explored in greater depth
in the following section.
III. THE RISE OF TRIBAL CULTURAL HEGEMONY UNDER IACA
AND NAGPRA/ARPA
As previously described, both IACA and NAGPRA were enacted with
the purpose of providing Native American tribes with greater autonomy and
control over tribal cultural heritage, both past and present. As this section
will demonstrate, however, both the IACA and the NAGPRA—through
their interplay with ARPA—have the unintended effect of concentrating
power over tribal culture in the hands of more powerful, established native
groups, much to the detriment of marginalized Indians who nonetheless are
important voices in tribal culture. Therefore, these statutes create tribal
cultural hegemonies that can truly “prescribe what shall be orthodox” in
terms of tribal culture.40 As a result, tribal groups and individuals that hold
less political and economic power find themselves on the losing side of
IACA and NAGPRA.
A. IACA AND THE REMAKING OF INDIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY
IACA turns on whether an item offered for sale is genuinely Indianmade or not. The statute defines “Indian” as “a member of an Indian tribe”
or a person who “is certified as an Indian artisan by an Indian tribe.”41
IACA includes state-recognized tribes within its ambit and in this regard,
IACA’s definition of “Indian” is seen as the “most deferential used by
Congress” in the whole of federal Indian law.42 The broad definition of
“Indian” and the power given to tribes to determine who is an Indian for the
purposes of the statue can be seen as a deliberate attempt by Congress to
find a more inclusive definition of “Indian.”43
Despite this, critics sharply contest whether IACA’s Indian definition
gives tribal groups more power or simply further erodes it.44 In Indian
country, the general reaction to IACA’s Indian definition has been harsh,
with the act viewed as yet another paternalistic attempt by Congress to
control Indian culture and decide who may and who may not participate in

40. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
41. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
42. Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer at the Core of Federal
Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 275, 282 (2001).
43. Id. at 313-14.
44. Id. at 315.
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it.45 Ultimately, among many tribes, IACA is seen as a failure, because, in
many ways, the act punishes members of the very groups it was passed to
protect.46
Ultimately, the failure of IACA is due to the fact that for the purposes
of determining who is an “Indian,” the Act’s definition simply resorts to the
political measuring stick of official tribal enrollment.47 Thus, under IACA,
Indians that are unenrolled in an official tribal group essentially stop being
“Indian” under the statute.48 As a result, IACA disadvantages many
otherwise genuine Indian artisans who may find themselves exposed to
criminal or civil liability if they present their work as “Indian.”49 Although
IACA allows tribes to certify non-member Indian artisans, certification is
ultimately still dependent on a showing of documented Indian lineage.50
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many American
Indians refuse, for various reasons, to officially enroll as a member of a
recognized—be it state or federal—tribe.51 Many Indian artisans also
lament the aesthetic effect of IACA’s definition: the authenticity of Indian
handicrafts under the statute is nominal only, because it is derived from a
restricted definition rather than the expressive authenticity of the work
itself.52 Thus, the “genuine Indian-made” label becomes a statement not
about the products themselves, but the cultural identity of their producers.53
Some Indian artisans view IACA and its definition of Indian as outright
racism and have compared its policy to that of a fascist government.54 If
African American artisans or Hispanic artisans do not need to certify their
work as genuine, these individuals argue, why should Indian artisans be
treated any differently?55 As a result, many otherwise genuine Indian
artisans face increased economic disadvantages imposed by the very statute
that was intended to protect their work and artistic identities.56

45. William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts
and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1033-37 (2001) (providing several Indian
opinions about the effect of IACA).
46. Woltz, supra note 6, at 448.
47. Id. at 450–51.
48. Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1012.
49. Woltz, supra note 6, at 447.
50. Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1026.
51. See Woltz, supra note 6, at 354 (describing some of the various reasons why many
otherwise ethnically and culturally genuine Indians refuse to associate with a formal tribe).
52. Id. at 464.
53. Id. at 491.
54. See Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1036.
55. Id.
56. Woltz, supra note 6, at 447–48.
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IACA has caused several high profile casualties.57 Shortly after the
statute’s enactment, the Museum of the Five Civilized Tribes in Muskogee,
Oklahoma was forced to close.58 The museum contained numerous works
of art that were created by Indian artisans, yet the museum curators feared
that many of the artists did not fall within IACA’s definition of “Indian.”59
Rather than subject itself to possible criminal and civil liability, the
museum closed.60
Two of North America’s most prominent Indian artists, Jimmie
Durham and Bert Seabourn, also found themselves on the wrong side of
Both artists had successful careers
IACA’s Indian classification.61
producing work that incorporated Indian themes, with some of Seabourn’s
paintings being put on permanent display in the Vatican.62 However, under
the terms of IACA, neither artist could present his work as “Indian” despite
the fact that both artists are culturally and ancestrally Cherokee.63 Durham
declined to seek admission as an enrolled member of the Cherokee tribe,
whereas Seabourn had his requested certification as an Indian artisan denied
by the Cherokee tribe.64 Likewise, some Indian artists, such Jeanne Walker
Rorex, have refused to seek certification altogether, viewing IACA’s
cultural certification of “authentic” Indian art as ideologically
objectionable.65
The statute has also adversely impacted entire tribes. The most
prominent example is an ongoing dispute between the Hopi and the
Navajo.66 Recently, the Navajo have begun producing imitation Hopi
Kachina dolls without adhering to traditional Hopi materials and
workmanship.67 Although the imitation dolls are undoubtedly counterfeit
and exactly the sort of imitation goods that IACA was enacted to prevent
from flooding the marketplace, there is no recourse under the statute for the
Hopi.68 Because the Navajo tribe is the group producing the dolls, the work
is technically Indian-made under IACA’s definition, although the dolls
themselves are not culturally Navajo. The ongoing Hopi-Navajo feud is but

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1011, 1034.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1034.
Id.
Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1034.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
Woltz, supra note 6, at 465.
Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1073–74.
Id. at 1074.
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the first prominent example of what many Indians feared IACA would lead
to: the emergence of an economically powerful tribe or class of Indians that
would control the global market in Indian handicrafts without heed for the
workmanship and traditions of less powerful groups.69
B. POWER IMBALANCE AND CULTURAL AMBIGUITY UNDER NAGPRA
AND ARPA
Before Congress enacted NAGRPA, all Native American remains were
considered federally owned property under the Antiquities Act of 1906.70
Culminating with NAGRPA, under each subsequent archaeology law that
Congress passed, Indian tribes were given greater and greater authority over
cultural resources and human remains.71
This trend also roughly
corresponds with the development of ethical codes and standards by the
United States’ major professional archaeological associations, which have
given more weight to cultural appreciation over time.72 As the field of
archaeology became more culturally sensitive in its pursuits, NAGPRA
sought to put Native American groups in a better bargaining position than
they had been historically—and perhaps, in a better position than
archaeologists.73 As a result, many commentators have criticized NAGPRA
for permitting Native American groups to hinder further development of a
historical understanding that would be of value to all humankind.74
For example, one anthropologist has likened the repatriation of ancient
human remains without first performing molecular and DNA scientific
studies of the remains to a person burning a lost work of Shakespeare after
reading it only once and then attempting to explain the work to the rest of
the world.75 In other words, repatriation of ancient remains without study
leaves anthropologists with only the most vague and impressionistic
conclusions as to what the scientific importance of such remains may be.

69. Id. at 1056.
70. Lucus Ritchie, Indian Burial Sites Unearthed: The Misapplication of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 71, 74
(2005).
71. Michelle Hibbert, Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the First Amendment, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 425, 427
(1999).
72. See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 263–64 (2005) (providing an overview of the development of
ethical codes among professional archaeologists).
73. See id. at 268.
74. Hibbert, supra note 71, at 435–36.
75. Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 392 (1998).
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Conversely, many Native American groups view the scientific study of
ancestral human remains as outright desecration and cultural destruction.76
Such a view is hardly unwarranted: an estimated one hundred thousand to
two million Native American graves across the United States have been
excavated and the human remains and sacred funerary objects relocated to
museums and research installations without tribal consent.77
However, NAGPRA—and its interplay with ARPA—ultimately
presents the same problem, albeit more removed, that IACA does, as who—
or whose remains—are “Indian” for the purposes of the Act can become
incredibly arbitrary and disadvantage certain legitimate Indians.78 Under
NAGPRA, those human remains found on tribal lands are supposed to be
returned to their lineal descendants, though in practice finding those lineal
descendants often proves to be an impossibility and the rightful owners
cannot be established with any certainty.79
Furthermore, those
archaeologists that wish to conduct legitimate excavations on tribal lands—
normally conducted under ARPA—must obtain tribal consent under
NAGPRA.80 This alone creates enormous problems, as the policy
objectives of ARPA and NAGPRA—to promote the scientific study of
cultural resources and to protect cultural integrity, respectively—are often
at odds with one another.81
Much like IACA, under NAGPRA, varying notions of tribal culture
and “Indianness” can allow more vocal, powerful tribal entities to assert
cultural hegemony over smaller and less organized cultural groups. To
assert jurisdiction over human remains under NAGPRA, a current Indian
tribe must show a “cultural affiliation” with the remains.82 The courts
examine a wide array of factors in determining cultural affiliation, including
geography, kinship, biological links, archaeological evidence, linguistics,
folklore, oral traditions, and expert opinion.83 Of course, given the tragic

76. Gene A. Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native
American Remains and Sacred Cultural Items, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 92 (1992).
77. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992).
78. See S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of Kennewick Man, 79
TEMPLE L. REV. 89, 94 (2006) (noting that in contentious NAGPRA claims, the question
ultimately becomes whether someone’s bones are “Indian”).
79. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 77, at 71; Lannan, supra note 75, at 398.
80. See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and
Contemporary Cultural Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 610-11 (1999) (noting that as the more
recent, specific statute, NAGPRA controls the less specific provisions of ARPA).
81. Id. at 609.
82. Id. at 601.
83. Id. The efficacy of oral tradition to establish cultural affiliation is cast in serious doubt
by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Bonnichsen v. United States. See 367 F.3d at 881–82 (rejecting
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trajectory of American Indian history in the United States, a substantial
number of Native American groups no longer reside on what were their
aboriginal lands.84 As a result, those remains found on “tribal” lands can
actually belong to now distantly located tribal groups, with the result being
that the wrong tribes often end up asserting jurisdiction over remains with
which they have no cultural ties.85 Furthermore, due to the lingering effects
of federal termination and assimilationist policies, many otherwise
legitimate Indian tribes cannot muster enough information to show the
cultural links necessary to obtain custody of human remains under
NAGPRA.86 This is complicated by the fact that cultural practices vary
wildly throughout the North American Indian tribes, which can lead courts
to impose inconsistent standards in NAGPRA disputes.87 Additionally,
NAGPRA gives presumptive custody of human remains to the tribe on
whose lands the remains were located, regardless of whether that tribe
resided there historically.88 This quirk of NAGPRA is exacerbated by the
fact that law further requires archaeologists that discover native remains to
consult with the culturally affiliated tribe, rather than the tribes that were
historically present in the same area.89 Thus, the implementation of
NAGPRA has the potential for disputes over the control of cultural
resources to develop between Indian tribes and archaeologists as well as
between Indian tribes and other Indian tribes. As one commentator has
noted, NAGPRA has not particularly resolved any disputes over cultural
resources, but rather reinvented the manner in which those disputes occur.90
The basic interplay between NAGPRA and ARPA is as follows.
NAGPRA does not come into effect until native human remains are
located—either advertently or inadvertently—on federal or tribal lands.91 If
for some reason NAGPRA does not apply, then the provisions of ARPA
fully cover the cultural resources and archaeologists, with a permit from the

tribes’ use of oral histories to establish a link between modern tribes and the remains of
Kennewick Man). For an extensive critique of the Bonnichsen decision, see Allison M. Dussias,
Kennewick Man, Kinship, and the “Dying Race”: The Ninth Circuit’s Assimilationist Assault on
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 55 (2005).
84. Marsh, supra note 76, at 100.
85. Id.
86. See Hibbert, supra note 71, at 437.
87. Suzianne D. Painter-Thorne, Contested Objects, Contested Meanings: Native American
Grave Protection Laws and the Interpretation of Culture, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1265
(2002).
88. See Lannan, supra note 75, at 398.
89. Painter-Thorne, supra note 87, at 1288.
90. Yasaitis, supra note 72, at 285.
91. Id. at 277.
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Department of the Interior, may study the resources and human remains.92
However, as previously noted, this jurisdictional split between NAGPRA
and ARPA—while certainly affording greater protection to Native
American cultural resources—can actually inhibit repatriation and proper
scientific studies that themselves could abet repatriation efforts.
As critics of NAGPRA note, primacy is given to the current, rather
than historical, occupancy of tribal lands in terms of determining cultural
affiliation, though that presumption was slightly eroded in Bonnichsen v.
United States.93 Though the Bonnichsen case, regarding the controversy
over the ownership of the so-called “Kennewick Man,” has been written
about ad nauseum, a brief explication of some of the issues in that case will
serve to illustrate the problems that can arise under NAGPRA in its current
form.
In Bonnichsen, several Native American tribes battled a group of
anthropologists for control of the remains of the Kennewick Man (or
“Ancient One”), an 8300 to 9200 year old skeleton discovered along the
banks of the Columbia River.94 The tribes sought custody of the remains to
rebury them, whereas the anthropologists wanted the remains for study,
given that a skeleton from Kennewick Man’s era of human history was an
extremely rare discovery.95 Though the district and circuit courts examined
a surfeit of historical and cultural evidence, the question in the case was
ultimately the same question that arises under IACA and the broader sweep
of federal Indian law: was Kennewick Man an Indian? Ultimately, because
the tribes could not muster enough evidence to establish that Kennewick
Man was an Indian, the remains passed into the custody of the
anthropologists under ARPA.96 Although the tribes were unable to
repatriate Kennewick Man’s remains, many commentators lauded the
decision, noting that since NAGPRA obviously does not apply to other
ancient human remains in North America—Viking, Spanish, English, etc.—
it is perfectly logical that NAGPRA should not apply to Kennewick Man
either.97 Ironically, subsequent DNA testing by anthropologists revealed

92. Id. at 283.
93. See Ray, supra note 78, at 90–91 (analyzing the state of NAGPRA jurisprudence after
the Bonnichsen decision and observing that location of human remains is no longer enough
evidence to establish cultural affiliation with a modern tribe).
94. 367 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2004).
95. Id. at 869.
96. Id. at 882.
97. Tsosie, supra note 80, at 599.

2017]

THE CREATION OF TRIBAL CULTURAL HEGEMONY

411

that Kennewick Man is indeed genetically related to modern Native
Americans.98
Thus, NAGPRA and ARPA can actually disrupt the very Indian culture
that the statutes are supposed to protect. First, the disruption of tribes’
historical geographies and the NAGPRA presumption of returning
unidentified human remains to the current landowning tribe can actually
prevent human remains from being repatriated to the proper ancestral tribe.
Second, the great discretion of tribes to approve excavation and study
permits under NAGPRA and ARPA can inhibit legitimate scientific and
anthropological study that could perhaps further proper repatriation efforts.
IV. ESTABLISHING GREATER HORIZONTAL CONTROL OVER
NATIVE CULTURE
As previously discussed, the implementation of both IACA and
NAGPRA inadvertently allow particular, and often random, Native
American tribes to wield considerable control over other Indians, tribes, and
segments of the academic community for the purposes of determining
Indian identity and ownership of cultural resources. Thus, tribes with less
economic or political power can find themselves in the uncomfortable
position of having other Indian groups resolving cultural questions for
them. The following sections suggest some solutions to this problem and
offer safeguards to prevent more powerful Native American tribes from
imposing “cultural hegemony” over less prominent groups.
A. RESOLVING THE IACA INDIAN IDENTITY PROBLEM
As previously mentioned, IACA, despite its unusually broad definition
of “Indian,” leaves many genuine Indian artisans by the wayside and places
sole authority over certification of non-member artisans in the hands of
recognized tribes.99 Additionally, the ongoing Kachina doll feud, between
the Hopi and the Navajo, exposes the risk of Indian tribes illegitimately
manufacturing the handicrafts of other tribes.100 Although some of these
issues could be resolved by retailoring the statute’s definition of “Indian,”
some commentators have noted that it would be difficult to do so without

98. Carl Zimmer, New DNA Results Show Kennewick Man Was Native American, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/science/new-dna-results-showkennewick-man-was-native-american.html?_r=0.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(3)(A)-(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316).
100. Woltz, supra note 6, at 464-65.
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treading on the inherent sovereign power of tribes to define and enforce
their own standards of tribal membership.101
A mechanism that would allow for more inclusive certification of nontribal Indian artisans would be an IACA Certification Board. Although this
panel would be a government instrumentality, it would be pan-Indian and
staffed entirely by members who are representative of the full breadth of
North America’s state and federally recognized tribes, rather than Bureau of
Indian Affairs functionaries or other bureaucrats. Unenrolled Indian
artisans could approach the comprehensive board for certification rather
than a tribe in which the artisan would not necessarily be able—or want—to
establish membership. Furthermore, such a board could also serve as a
forum for Indian crafts disputes that arise between tribes, such as the Hopi
and Navajo. Decisions of the board would be legally binding and thus
allow tribes or individuals the ability to challenge them under the
Administrative Procedure Act, thereby providing an avenue for otherwise
unavailable relief.
IACA Indian certification is essentially a trademark.102 However,
simply relying on existing United States patent and trademark law to avoid
the pitfalls of IACA would be to fundamentally disregard the distinct nature
of the products that IACA protects. The Indian handicrafts safeguarded
under the statute are more than mere commodities. Rather, they are living
examples of Indian handicraft and artistic traditions.
An IACA
Certification Board would still protect the cultural integrity of these
traditions while simultaneously providing a rational solution to the
problems under the statute.
B. RESOLVING REPATRIATION DISPUTES UNDER NAGPRA
As previously explored in greater, the repatriation provisions under
NAGRPA do not always produce desirable results for all tribes and
competing scientific entities. The Bonnichsen decision demonstrates that
the statute in its current form can produce absurd results, such as giving a
finding by the Secretary of the Interior greater controlling weight than
scientific data.103 However, on the whole, NAGPRA accomplishes what
Congress intended the statute to do: to protect Native American burial sites
and establish a process for current tribes to obtain custody of remains

101. Id. at 496.
102. Id. at 447.
103. Renee M. Kosslak, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: The
Death Knell for Scientific Study?, 24 AM. IND. L. REV. 129, 149 (2000).
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discovered or held by museums.104 Regardless of its general efficacy, the
statute could be tweaked slightly in order to better hone its purpose and
corresponding results.
First, NAGPRA and its implementing regulations should be revised to
place a primary presumption on the geographically historic tribe—rather
than the current landowning tribe—for repatriation purposes when human
remains are discovered on tribal or federal lands. As previously discussed,
the history of Native Americans in the United States often makes it difficult
to establish cultural affiliation between human remains and a current Indian
tribe.105
The current NAGPRA regime requires archaeologists or
government actors that discover human remains to consult with the
landowning tribe rather than the historically present tribe.106 Because many
current tribes no longer reside on their ancestral lands, the current
NAGPRA presumption should be reversed to require consultation with
historical tribes first, and then the current tribes second. Thus, even if the
culturally affiliated historical tribe cannot be located, the human remains
will at least receive proper care at the hands of another Native American
group rather than falling into the hands of a museum or researcher, and
thereby, defeating NAGPRA’s purpose. This alteration would ensure that
tribes experiencing geographic and cultural disruption at the hands of the
United States government would still be able to repatriate remains even
though they may now only occupy small, distant tracts of non-ancestral
land.
Second, NAGPRA and its regulations should be implemented to allow
for a balancing test between scientific study and cultural repatriation in
exceptional cases, such as that of Kennewick Man. Under the current
regime, scientists may only study human remains under an ARPA permit
when NAGPRA does not apply, essentially preventing researchers from
conducting any work on the history of North America’s indigenous
peoples.107 In fact, many archaeologists advocate for a change to the law
where the scientific community would have equal bargaining power with
Native American tribes in regard to the study of human remains.108

104. See generally NAGPRA at 10: A Critique, MUSEUM NEWS 43–49, 67–75 (2000),
http://www.academia.edu/3158470/NAGPRA_at_10_Examining_a_decade_of_the_Native_Amer
ican_Graves_Protection_and_Repatriation_Act (providing a series of viewpoints evaluating
NAGPRA’s successes and shortcomings ten years following the statute’s enactment).
105. Hibbert, supra note 71, at 437.
106. Painter-Thorne, supra note 87, at 1288.
107. Yasaitis, supra note 72, at 283; see also Kosslak, supra note 103, at 131–32 (noting
that NAGPRA may have the practical effect of discouraging legitimate scientific study, even
though that was not the statute’s purpose).
108. Hibbert, supra note 71, at 438.
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Furthermore, some commentators have argued for a “testing exception” to
NAGPRA in those cases where it is clear that substantial scientific
knowledge will be gained through study of the remains.109 Accordingly,
NAGPRA, or its regulations, should be amended to allow for such a
process. In those exceptional and rare situations where it is clear than an
archaeological discovery of human remains will yield significant scientific
knowledge, a federal court could impose guidelines for a limited study
under the oversight of the culturally affiliated tribe. At the conclusion of
the study, the remains would be returned to the culturally affiliated Native
American group for ceremonial reburial. Thus, should the future unearth
another Kennewick Man, NAGPRA will be able to accommodate the
interests of all parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted both IACA and NAGPRA to better protect Native
American culture and give Indian tribes greater control over their own
cultural output. However, in some circumstances, both statutes have
actually alienated legitimate members of the Indian community and allowed
particular tribes to assert greater authority over pan-Indian culture. Simple
revisions of both IACA and NAGPRA would allow for greater cultural
autonomy for Native American groups nationwide and encourage cultural
exchange between Indians and non-native communities. Although such
revisions would ultimately benefit many Native Americans, the power to
make such changes remains in Congress and the Department of the Interior.
Doing so, however, would greatly benefit many Native American tribes and
unaffiliated American Indians.

109. Kosslak, supra note 103, at 151.

